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This article examines the complex legacy of David Petraeus who was a key
figure in the emergence of the US military shift towards counterinsurgency
doctrine in the years after 2006. Although Petraeus has been perceived by
critics as a publicity seeker, he can be credited with laying the foundations
for a more serious commitment to COIN involving in particular in integrating
conventional and Special Forces in arenas like village stability operations.
The article looks a Petraeus’s role in both Iraq and Afghanistan: it concludes
that, in the case of Afghanistan, it is too early to assess whether
counterinsurgency has had a decisive impact of the outcome of the war
against the Taliban.
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On 9 November 2012, David H. Petraeus announced his resignation as director of
the Central Intelligence Agency following revelations about an extramarital
affair with Paula Broadwell, who had written a laudatory biography about him.1
Many shared Broadwell’s overwhelmingly positive assessment of Petraeus’s
impact on America’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.2
His resignation marked an abrupt fall from grace for a figure who had been at
the center of American military operations against Islamic insurgents for nearly a
decade. He commanded America’s armies in Iraq and Afghanistan, spearheaded
the development of new military doctrine for the land forces to help fight these
wars, and further carried on the struggle against terrorism in his last job as
director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The rise and fall of David Petraeus
had been nothing if not dramatic.
On the surface, the decline of Petraeus seemed relatively straightforward and
even unremarkable by the standards of Washington politics, in which scandal
routinely undoes senior leaders and political figures. But the rise and fall of
Petraeus is far more complex – yet, in some ways, is in keeping with his own
legacy. He was seen by many as a hero who almost singlehandedly rescued the
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country from disaster in Iraq and Afghanistan, by some as a classic maverick and
transformative figure who overcame seemingly insurmountable odds to force
innovation and change on hidebound and backward-looking bureaucracies, by
others as a narcissistic and tireless self-promoter who consistently oversold his
accomplishments, and by still others as an inherently corrupt figure who
deliberately created false and misleading narratives in both the Iraq and
Afghanistan war.3 By the end of America’s decade of war, Petraeus had come to
embody the complexities and contradictions not just of the institution he
represented but of the country itself and the strategic choices made by its political
leadership and endorsed by its citizenry
This article assesses the complex legacy of Petraeus and his role in shaping
the decade of America’s irregular wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. He profoundly
influenced both wars not just by his command of military forces in both conflicts,
but through his role in championing the tactics of counterinsurgency in the
manual FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency. The manual provided a template around
which battalion and brigade commanders could structure their training to prepare
their units for deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. Petraeus did more than just
put together team to produce new counterinsurgency doctrine when he was
assigned to take over the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command from 2005 to
2007. He commanded the 101st Airborne Division in Mosul in 2003 and 2004
and then took over as the first commander of the Multi-National Security
Transition Command – Iraq from 2004 to 2005. Following his assignment at the
Army’s Training and Doctrine Command from 2005 to 2007, Petraeus took over
command of Multi-National War – Iraq in the spring of 2007 in conjunction with
the commitment of 30,000 additional troops as part of the ‘surge’ to reverse the
tide of what was widely perceived to be a losing war. His shadow became widely
cast, and he was identified in various laudatory accounts as a singularly heroic
figure who rescued the country from strategic disaster in Iraq during 2007 and
2008 as he imposed a new way of fighting on supposedly reluctant institutions
that opposed his ideas.4 He commanded US forces in Iraq until 2008, when he
was assigned to take over the United States Central Command in Tampa, FL,
where he served until the Obama administration sent him to Afghanistan
following the firing of General Stanley McChrystal in 2010 to rescue the country
from another failing war – this time in Afghanistan.
This article frames the evolution of Petraeus and his impact on military
operations in historical and strategic terms and attempts to deconstruct some of
the myths that grew up around this larger than life figure at different stages in the
wars. It argues that Petraeus profoundly affected the conduct of military
operations in America’s irregular wars, but not necessarily in the ways suggested
in the popular narratives. Far from being a transformative figure who offered a
new way of war, Petraeus trod a well-beaten path like those before him, offering
up a shop-worn set of tactics that could not alter the negative strategic
circumstances of the wars he fought in.
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War and the political general
By the time of his fall, he had become an embodiment of the quintessentially
political–military figure cut from the cloth described by the British historian Hew
Strachan in his seminal work The Politics of the British Army5 and by Andrew
Bacevich in his equally important book The New American Militarism.6 Both
books chronicle the evolution of and the inherently political nature of military
institutions in Britain and the United States. The political figures who rose within
their ranks did so largely as a result of their wartime leadership, which meddled in
the politics of their respective countries. Petraeus unquestionably represented one
of these figures.
Petraeus represented an important political figure on two levels. First, he
presented himself along with a group of advisers who followed him to Iraq and
Afghanistan as fighting against the entrenched political interests of the Army in
reorienting the institution towards the demands of fighting irregular wars.
Second, and perhaps more significantly, he eventually became aligned with and
the darling of neoconservative Republicans clustered in the Pentagon at the outset
of the Bush Administration in 2001 as well as right-wing ideologues prowling the
halls of Washington, DC think tanks at the American Enterprise Institute,
the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, the Institute for the Study of War,
the Heritage Foundation, and the Project for a New American Century. He also
became a favorite of the Center for New American Security, which provided a
centrist, democratically oriented think thank stuffed full of pro-war counter-
insurgency experts who enthusiastically supported him. Petraeus indeed built a
wide and varied political constituency.
Neoconservatives used the circumstances of the 9/11 attacks to execute a
more militarized and muscular foreign policy around the world packaged under
the Bush Administration’s ‘global war on terror’.7 Petraeus and his allegedly new
way of war offered these groups the military leader they needed to organize and
lead American’s armies in their quest to assert American primacy and to fight the
so-called ‘long war’ against anti-modern Islamic terrorists. Petraeus accepted and
encouraged the political alliance for his own purposes as he sought higher
military and, later, government office. The Obama Administration rightfully
regarded him with suspicion as a potential political rival and gave him the job as
CIA director partly to keep him off the streets during the election season in 2012.8
His alliance with the neoconservatives stemmed from strategic failure that in
some ways dealt Petraeus a losing hand at the outset – despite his tireless and
arguably effective attempts to create an alternative story line. The
neoconservatives and their military guru Andy Marshall, the Pentagon’s long-
time director of Net Assessments, argued that that American’s twenty-first
century wars should be fought with advanced weaponry under the rubric of the
RMA using precision guided munitions destroying enemy targets at great
distances in operations knitted together under the overarching concept of effects
based operations. RMA theorists believed that a new generation of long-range
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weapons guided onto targets by advanced digital sensors could destroy enemy
centers of gravity, leading to the quick collapse of enemy armies. RMA advocates
argued this new way of war meant that large armies fighting attritional,
protracted, and bloody battles were no longer necessary. This vision fit perfectly
with the neoconservative embrace of conducting preventative wars against
despotic dictators developing weapons of mass destruction in the newly
proclaimed age of terror. The neoconservative adoption of Petraeus came only
after the strategic failure of the ‘shock and awe’ invasions of Iraq and
Afghanistan as it became apparent that the toppling of their respective regimes
only represented the opening phase of the struggle for political ascendancy inside
each country. As the insurgencies gathered strength in both countries, it became
obvious that the United States would have to resort to the constabulary missions
and the kinds of nation-building activities that the neoconservatives wanted to
avoid. These missions needed large armies on the ground for extended periods,
just as the fired Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki had presciently
suggested in 2003. The struggle for political control in each country remains
underway over a decade after the invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in
2003.9 The neoconservatives needed someone to rescue them and their country
from their strategic debacles, and, in Petraeus, they thought they had their man.
The appearance of the iconic Petraeus, whose image routinely appeared in
print and on the airwaves over the decade of America’s wars, must also be seen as
reflecting the broader militarization of US society and the veneration of its
military institutions that became particularly pronounced and encouraged by
political leaders in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.10 The veneration of these
institutions in some senses sought to lift the stain on the legacy of the land forces
that had been defeated in Vietnam a generation ago in another irregular war
thousands of miles from home.
Despite the clever packaging job provided by the neoconservatives, the 9/11
attacks ushered in only the latest episode of American constabulary/policing
missions in the developing world that bore striking resemblance to similar uses of
force by France and Britain in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Right-wing
ideologues justified the Iraq and Afghanistan wars partly as a return to America’s
imperial policing missions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and
cast the twenty-first century wars as a justifiable and necessary cost of asserting
American global leadership.11 Whether by design or not, Petraeus became the
American face of these wars – a heroic and larger than life figure sent out from
the homeland to try and tame the unruly and dangerous masses thousands of miles
from home.
Like military leaders before him fighting these wars during the last century,
he clearly realized the importance of manipulating information and managing
popular perceptions to avoid a repeat of Vietnam where popular support for the
war collapsed. Unlike British and French military leaders of an earlier generation,
however, Petraeus conducted business in the digital age of globalization and the
continuous 24-hour news cycle. He consciously sought to create favorable
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narratives about himself and his activities by cultivating journalists and alleged
think tank experts who could help in his self-aggrandizement and the broader
cause he saw himself as serving. A coterie of reporters and analysts followed him
around as a kind of imperial entourage through his various high-level jobs.
A hallmark of his tenure commanding the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan was strict
control over the message released to the media. During his command of coalition
forces in Afghanistan, he fired officers who spoke to the press expressing
negative comments about the war; this had a chilling effect throughout the
organizations he commanded.12 Some believed he deliberately falsified
information about the wars he fought in and created a misleading impression
to the public and his political leaders about the actual state of affairs on the
ground.13 In the end, the system that helped propel him to prominence proved his
undoing, as he made a personal misstep with one of the many coterie of admiring
journalists and analysts that he collected to help sell and promote himself to an
admiring public.
Past as prologue
Americans have notoriously short historical memories. If they chose to delve into
military history more deeply, they would realize that political–military figures
like Petraeus routinely appeared during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
The history of Western militaries fighting irregular wars in far-flung corners of
the globe is populated with a variety of military leaders who had much in
common with Petraeus. These leaders, many of whom are regarded as the
‘fathers’ of counterinsurgency, all had similar narratives and common themes
that surrounded their careers.14 Thomas-Robert Bugeaud, Joseph Gallieni,
Hubert Lyautey, Roger Trinquier, Jacques Massu, David Galula, C. E. Callwell,
Sir Gerald Templer, Sir Robert Thompson, Sir Garnet Wolseley, Harold Briggs,
Frank Kitson, and Orde Wingate were all in one way or another Petraeus-like
figures. Like Petraeus, these military leaders from France and Great Britain
commanded forces in different strategic circumstances and confronted difficult
(if not impossible) tactical environments that were dropped into their laps by
strategic choices made by their political leaders.15
Like Petraeus, all were military leaders tasked with fighting guerillas in
foreign lands. Many amounted to colonial and imperial policing missions that, to
varying degrees, turned into grand and largely unsuccessful social engineering
projects. Many of these foreign wars included a powerful moral component that
packaged the narrative surrounding the commitment of force. In the nineteenth
century, the West’s imperial colonial wars were cast partly as civilizing missions
consistent with Rudyard Kipling’s ‘white man’s burden’ poem published in 1899
in McClure’s Magazine. Kipling and others believed these imperial wars would
uplift the less advanced peoples of the world with Western values, culture,
religion, and institutions.16 The imperial wars of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries had an undeniable racist character; a theme that resonated with
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neoconservative and right-wing ideologues in the United States following the
9/11 attacks, which cast the American wars as a crusade against anti-Western
Islamic radicals.17 Interestingly, in the American context, the neoconservative
ideologues eventually found themselves joined at the hip with liberal
internationalists like the political scientists Joseph Nye, Fareed Zakaria,
Samantha Power, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and others who argued that military
interventions could serve broader moral purposes.
In addition to desperate attempts to hold on to their imperial domains, the
West packaged their twentieth century wars as part of a global crusade against
communism. Both France and the United States dove head first into irregular
wars in Indochina partly, in the case of France, to preserve their empire, and, in
the case of the United States, to prevent the spread of communism throughout
Southeast Asia. During the 1960s, many believed that Vietnam represented one
of a series of ‘dominoes’ that would collapse under control of the Soviet and
Chinese central committees if the United States did not hold the line. Britain
likewise fought a series of similar and largely unsuccessful holding actions to
preserve its empire throughout the twentieth century.
In the end, the twentieth century’s wars of national liberation were just that,
and the West proved unable substantially to alter the quest for independence that
swept the globe after the end of World War II. The strategic circumstances of the
post World War II environment simply could not be reversed by clever tactics
practiced by Western militaries packaged up as counterinsurgency.18 Like the
nineteenth and twentieth century wars, the twenty-first century American wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan in which Petraeus participated were promoted as wars with
a higher moral purpose. Like his predecessors before him, Petraeus became the
American face of what became grand civilizing missions and the most ambitious
social engineering projects ever attempted in the modern era.
Western military leaders tasked with fighting these wars offered up ideas
packaged under the concept of ‘counterinsurgency’ as a scheme for the
employment of military force to cope with the task of bending the will of an
indigenous population in ways that suited the interest of the occupying power.
Petraeus must be seen as only the most recent incarnation of these Western
military figures, and there is nothing particularly distinct or remarkable about his
experiences and his wider impact in this regard. Most of these military leaders,
including Petraeus, suggested that counterinsurgency represented a kinder and
gentler form of warfare that sought to win the ‘hearts and minds’, or political
allegiance, of the indigenous population. They argued that fighting in this way
could be done at relatively lower human, economic, and moral cost to the
occupying power in contrast to the bloody conventional wars fought by
developed states in World Wars I and II. Counterinsurgency advocates suggested
that the objective of military operations in irregular war was not to defeat the
insurgents through direct action but to protect the local populations from the
insurgents through establishing what French military leader Joseph Gallieni and
his protégé Hubert Lyautey called ‘oil spots’, or zones of security, that were free
74 J. A. Russell
from insurgent control and influence. Once security had been established in these
zones, they argued it was possible to establish political control and promote
economic development so the indigenous population would turn their allegiance
from the insurgents to whatever authority was responsible for providing security
and governance.19
Gallieni and Lyautey plied their trade in policing operations in Indochina and
North Africa in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Both were
forerunners of a later cast of French military leaders that was decisively defeated
in Vietnam and Algeria. An irony of America’s experiences in Iraq was that Bush
Administration officials initially looked back at France’s disastrous experiences
in Algeria as represented in Gillo Pontecorvo’s movie The Battle of Algiers as
holding valuable lessons for American commanders in their fights against Iraqi
insurgents. Viewings of the movie actually occurred in the Pentagon as the
insurgency in Iraq gathered momentum in 2004 and 2005. American field
commanders in Iraq indeed did familiarize themselves with France’s failed
counterinsurgency tactics as suggested by David Galula and others during 2005
and 2006 after their political leaders unexpectedly asserted in late 2005 that the
US strategy in Iraq sought to ‘clear, hold, and build’ areas of Iraq as a way to
wrest them from insurgent control.20
In the end, like those before him, Petraeus proved no more successful than his
predecessors in altering the negative strategic circumstances of the wars through
the employment of counterinsurgency tactics. Like the French in Algeria and
Vietnam, no amount of tactical proficiency by US military units could alter the
unfavorable strategic circumstances of the wars in either Iraq or Afghanistan.
America’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan proved no kinder or gentler than their
predecessors in which tens of thousands of people perished in brutal, bloody, and
awful circumstances.21 The wars did little to win the political allegiance of the
indigenous populations in either Iraq or Afghanistan. The Maliki government in
Iraq breathed an audible sigh of relief when the US finally exited in 2011 and
declined to endorse any arrangements to allow US forces to operate out of bases
in Iraq. Last but not least, far from being ‘low cost’ military ventures, the
Afghanistan and Iraq wars were wars fought at enormous monetary, strategic, and
human cost to both the occupied country and the occupying power, belying the
fraudulent promises of Western counterinsurgency experts stretching back over a
century.22
Another commonality with the earlier wars that was also practiced by various
of these nineteenth and twentieth century military leaders – and this was
certainly true of Petraeus – was that these leaders sought to control and shape the
release of public information about military operations. All these leaders grasped
an inescapable truth of irregular war: it was almost impossible for the occupying
power to demonstrate progress in the fight.23 Irregular war required decentralized
operations with authority delegated down the chain of command to shape
operations to suit local circumstances. In these environments, it was difficult for
commanders to demonstrate success to secure continued political support on the
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home front for the continued employment of force. All of the West’s leaders
during these wars grappled with this problem and generated a dizzying array of
indicators as they sought to manage public and political perceptions of success
and failure. Petraeus in particular proved to be a master at crafting a favorable
narrative of success that resonated with the public, the Washington journalist
commentariat, and his political masters. In David Petraeus, the country got what
it paid for and, it must be said, it got what it wanted and deserved.
Sex, lies, and videotape: Deconstructing the myths of Petraeus
The previous section argues that Petraeus remains an unremarkable figure when
taken in historical context. Many military leaders before him had confronted
similar circumstances in fighting guerillas, had addressed the same kinds of
problems on the battlefield, and reacted in similar ways to try and defeat the
insurgents. The next section of the article addresses specific parts of the Petraeus
narrative as contained in books by Paula Broadwell, Thomas Ricks, and others
that deal with more specific accomplishments. This section will address three
central issues in assessing the impact of Petraeus on America’s wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan: (1) his role in reorienting a change-resistant Army away from
conventional war to irregular war; (2) his impact on military operations in Iraq,
particularly after the increase of US troops in 2007 and 2008; and (3) his role in
implementing counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan.
At the strategic level, the most significant assertion is that Petraeus and a
coterie of maverick advisers singlehandedly reoriented a change-resistant and
bureaucratically hidebound Army away from conventional to irregular war.24
Petraeus clearly played an important role in this process, but neither he nor his
cast of advisers were singularly responsible for forcing a supposedly change-
resistant institution to adopt a new way of war. Over the decade of war,
America’s land forces (Army and Marine Corps) became focused on the tasks of
fighting irregular wars since these were the wars their civilian masters directed
them to fight in 2001 and then backed up their words by sending them to Iraq and
Afghanistan to fight them. Their sister services, the Navy and the Air Force,
followed suit primarily in a supporting role to transport the land forces to the fight
and to keep them in the field once there.25
There is no doubt that American political leaders directed their military
institutions to prepare for and then carry out these wars and that the institutions
responded, however grudgingly. Moreover, the experiences of actual combat
(starting in 2001 in Afghanistan and 2003 in Iraq) created its own pressures for
learning and adaptation in the field as it became apparent in both wars that the
land forces were unprepared to fight in these environments. Over the course of
the wars, pressures to adapt bubbled up from within the units as a natural part of
the experience of fighting, which greatly influenced the gradual building
of institutional momentum to focus on irregular warfare.26 Pressures on the land
forces to adapt in the field came from myriad sources – and the institutions
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responded. These pressures came from the field, within the service bureaucracies,
and from the country’s senior political leadership. All of these pressures occurred
simultaneously and were interrelated.
America’s decade of war following the 9/11 attacks represented an
unprecedented period in recent US history in which civilian authorities subjected
their military institutions to an unprecedented level of top-down direction backed
up with implementing directives that ordered these institutions to improve their
ability to fight irregular wars.27 The Bush Administration released a veritable
flood of strategy documents setting new priorities for its armed forces that all
emphasized the need to reorient the nation’s armed forces away from
conventional conflict towards fighting irregular warfare and combating terrorism,
which was believed to be the most likely environment encountered in these
operations. The strategy documents became operationalized in various
Department of Defense reports, directives, and guidance directing to the military
departments to reorient their priorities to the demands of fighting the so-called
war on terror.28
The Department of Defense promulgated a host of internal planning
documents and directives designed to shape military operations in Afghanistan
and Iraq. On the eve of the Iraq invasion, the Army released FM 2-07, Stability
Operations and Support Operations, followed by the interim 3-07.22,
Counterinsurgency Operations in October 2004. In September 2004, the Joint
Forces Command published the Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept to
guide commanders in the field. As the Marines and Army blasted their way
through Fallujah in November 2004, the Defense Science Board published a
report Transition to and From Hostilities that called for the Defense Department
to develop new organizational capacities to manage environments following the
conclusion of conventional military operations. Following this report, the
Defense Department in November 2005 promulgated DOD Directive 3000.05,
‘Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR)
Operations’, which established stability operations as a core mission for the
Defense Department. That guidance was subsequently updated in September
2009 further to reinforce and align intra-organizational support for the mission.29
In September 2007, the Joint Forces Command and the Special Operations
Command published an initial Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept that
was updated most recently in May 2010.30
While extremely important, the release of FM 3-24 in December 2006
occurred in a particular context amidst a host of what could be characterized as
‘rear echelon’ activities to support engaged forces. All of these directives and
reports were in one way or another designed to foster the growth of
counterinsurgency capabilities across the board, which was seen as necessary to
improve performance in the field.
Importantly, the Defense Department in parallel established an elaborate and
expensive support structure to address myriad problems facing troops in the field.
For example, to counter the pervasive problem of improvised explosive devices,
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the United States mounted a massive research and development effort by various
arms of the US government. According to one count, the counter-IED effort
involved as many as 23 separate government offices and 73 companies. In 2006,
the Defense Department formed an entire new organization called the Joint
Improvised Explosive Device Defense Organization (JIEDDO) to coordinate the
effort. By the spring of 2010 the organization was reported to have 3600
employees and to have spent an estimated $17 billion on its programs.
Petraeus unquestionably played a central role in the development of the land
forces’ counterinsurgency doctrine. His initiative and relationship with the
Marine Corps’ General James Mattis were instrumental in forming the drafting
team headed by Conrad Crane during 2006 that prepared the new manual. The
new doctrine and concepts for operations were both developed in parallel with
wartime learning that had to some extent had already seen the land forces become
completely focused on irregular warfare by 2007.31 There can be no doubt that
the combination of learning in wartime and deliberate organizational efforts at
the national level combined to reorient the military departments towards
developing the capabilities originally called for by the Bush Administration in
2001 to combat terrorism and fight irregular war.32 The new joint doctrine in FM
3-24 represented an important centerpiece of this overall effort, and Petraeus
rightly deserves credit for its promulgation. As the preceding summary has
shown, however, publication of the manual represented only one of a number of
actions involving multiple organizations that sought to address the obvious
problems being experienced by troops in the field.
The second major impact of Petraeus was his role in overseeing military
operations in Iraq in conjunction with the decision by the Bush Administration to
increase troops by 30,000 in early 2007. It is generally believed that the surge
proved instrumental in reversing the tide of a losing war. The surge occurred in
conjunction with the release of FM 3-24 and the appointment of Petraeus to
command the Multi-National Forces Iraq. Petraeus arrived in Baghdad in the
spring in early 2007 with prior field experience in Mosul commanding the 101st
Division in 2003 and 2004. During his command in Mosul, he certainly
previewed his preference for counterinsurgency as contrasted to many of his
colleagues following the invasion. The 101st opened a police training academy,
held elections for a local governing council, and made generous use of
reconstruction funds. Many saw Mosul as the exception to an otherwise badly
bungled occupation and credited Petraeus.33 Like other areas of Iraq, however, no
amount of tactical proficiency by the 101st or imaginative leadership by Petraeus
could reverse the slide into chaos and violence as the insurgency became steadily
more lethal throughout 2003 and 2004. Following the departure of the 19,000-
strong 101st in early 2004, it was replaced by a single brigade, which proved
wholly incapable of policing Mosul’s population of 1.8 million – to say nothing
of the surrounding countryside. Order collapsed in the city in November 2004 as
the police abandoned their posts and insurgents ruled the city for several days
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until Kurdish militia and US troops restored order. Mosul and the rest of the
province remained extremely dangerous for the next several years.
The experience of the 101st and Petraeus in Mosul represented a classic
problem for militaries fighting in irregular war: how were units supposed to
evaluate progress in the field and how were they supposed to evaluate the impact
of their operations in the environment? It was a problem that hounded US
commanders throughout the war. Were they succeeding or failing? What impact
were their operations having? How did they measure success? The experience of
the 3rd Armored Combat Regiment (ACR) commanded by Colonel H. R.
MacMaster in Tal Afar in Ninewa province during 2005 and 2006 similarly
captured these problems.34 The occupation of Tal Afar by the regiment’s 5200
troops using counterinsurgency tactics was seen by many as one of the early
successes of the war, and many commanders following these operations copied
the approach taken by McMaster in quelling violence in the city of 220,000.
Whatever the assessments of the 3rd ACR performance, however, as follow-on
units discovered, the city remained a dangerous environment long after the
departure of the celebrated regiment. The 3rd ACR did not defeat the insurgency
in Tal Afar, contrary to the popular narrative – although insurgent violence
clearly declined over the course the deployment. An implication from the
experience, however, was that (as in Mosul), high concentrations of US troops in
urban areas spread out in the neighborhoods could help reduce insurgent
violence.
The experiences of the 3rd ACR had important implications for the tactical
approach taken by the US land forces elsewhere in Iraq. Commanders paid
attention to the approach employed by the 3rd ACR and began adapting their
methods to suit their own localized circumstances. There is no question that
during 2005 and 2006 a process of learning in the field occurred – albeit on an ad
hoc basis that depended on the willingness of battalion commanders to learn and
adapt. That process began building momentum around the country and most
particularly in western Anbar by the Marine Corps units and, most significantly
by the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, or 1/1, in Ramadi in the summer and
fall of 2006.35 Operations in Ramadi in 2007 and 2007 occurred in conjunction
with the turning of the allegiance of the Sunni tribes of Anbar away from the
Jihadist insurgent towards the occupying US forces. By the spring of 2007, the
epicenter of the Sunni insurgency in Anbar province was relatively quiet as many
insurgents that had been shooting at the occupying forces had been given
uniforms and told to start directing traffic and performing other constabulary
duties by their tribal leaders.
Just as the tribal awakening unfolded in Anbar in 2006, pressure began
building in Washington to replace the US military commander General George
Casey to reverse the direction of the war. Late in 2006, a group of advisers and
think tank experts convinced President Bush finally to send more troops to Iraq.36
It had been abundantly clear since that outset of the war that the United States had
under-resourced the war. The troop shortage was so acute during the summer of
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2005, that a Marine unit in Ramadi acknowledged using cardboard dummies to
deceive Iraqis.37
Petraeus arrived as MNF-I commander in early 2007 to orchestrate a national
counterinsurgency campaign, and there is no doubt that he executed this plan
through top-down direction that emphasized a common and coordinated
approach in the field. For the first time in the war, the United States was able to
move forces into areas that had received no significant coalition presence. In
addition to having additional troops, Petraeus unleashed Joint Special Operations
Command units in Baghdad commanded by General Stanley McChrystal in 2007
and 2008 that eviscerated insurgent networks in and around Baghdad.38 By 2007
and 2008, the United States and its conventional and Special Forces had become
adept at attacking insurgent networks through intelligence collection and directed
raids that killed and detained hundreds of suspects. All agree that there was a
dramatic reduction in insurgent violence in Iraq after mid 2007, but it remains
unclear what caused the reduction.
By mid 2007, various national political and military factors had altered the
landscape of the war, particularly surrounding Baghdad.39 Perhaps most
significantly, by 2007 the Sunnis had lost the sectarian civil war. Those that
remained aligned themselves with the US as survival tactic and entered into an
uneasy truce with the Maliki government in Baghdad. Ethnic cleansing by Shiite
death squads operating out of units created by the United States in the Iraqi
Security Forces and the police also had driven hundreds of thousands of mostly
Sunni middle class Iraqis (as well as other religious and ethnic minorities) from
their neighborhoods in Baghdad.40 By the end of 2007, the United Nations
estimated that 2.2 million Iraqis had fled the country and were residing in refugee
camps in surrounding states.41 It is also clear that the ISF had become more
capable after herculean efforts by US advisers and billions of dollars to rebuild
the Army that had been serendipitously disbanded in 2003 by the Coalition
Provisional Authority.42 All these factors affected the political environment in
the country and the sources of grievance with the occupying force and the
national government that had driven the insurgency.
The reduction of insurgent violence during the period of the surge can be
traced to various political and military factors. Military operations coordinated by
Petraeus and his deputy General Ray Odierno undoubtedly represented an
important piece of the puzzle.43 Contrary to the popular narrative, however, the
surge did not win the war. The net result of the surge was to help create
circumstances to cover the US withdrawal so neoconservatives and others could
assert that the United States had in fact achieved something worthwhile in Iraq.
While he did not ‘win’ the war in the surge, Petraeus deserves great credit for
helping to create the circumstances for the withdrawal from what had been the
most disastrous military adventure undertaken by the United States since the
Vietnam War.
Like the surge in Iraq, the assignment of Petraeus to Afghanistan to replace
McChrystal happened in the context of an increase in troops thought necessary to
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change America’s battlefield fortunes. When he arrived in Afghanistan, Petraeus
set about trying to continue along the path that had been emphasized by his
predecessor in executing a national counterinsurgency campaign. The increase in
troops provided commanders with the means to protect the population in areas
that had never had significant coalition forces present. The US also flowed many
of its information, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms into the war
that had been deployed in Iraq. Specialized Army units like Task Force Odin
(a package of ISR platforms) deployed into Afghanistan, providing ground units
with a new level of surveillance and intelligence support.44 The use of ISR and
intelligence collection capabilities fed into a targeting process that had been
refined and used to great effect in Iraq against insurgent groups.
Military operations under both McChrystal and Petraeus featured the
integration Special Forces more comprehensively into the counterinsurgency
campaign. This included initiatives like the Village Stabilization Operations in
the spring of 2010 that sought to build security from the ground up in addition to
the top-down efforts at the national level.45 The program inserted 12-man special
operations teams into villages around Afghanistan to develop local police and
militias to provide security for their villages. They initially focused on nine
villages in Arghandab District located just to the north of Kandahar in southern
Afghanistan.46 These programs initially received only grudging support of the
Afghanistan government because of fears that that program would create forces
not directly connected to the Afghan government. By fall of 2011, a program that
had started with the nine villages in 2010 had expanded to include 1000 US
Special Forces from the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force
(CJSOTF-A) in over 103 locations covering 23,300 square kilometers.47
Special Forces became more integrated in operations after 2009 in other
ways. In Iraq, both the conventional and special operations forces had refined a
targeting process built on intelligence collection coupled with link-nodal analysis
that provided a detailed picture of insurgent networks. In Iraq, the targeting
centered on ‘high value targets’ (HVTs). In Afghanistan, the Joint Special
Operations Command and conventional forces took the basic methodology
developed in Iraq and aggressively applied it in Afghanistan, particularly after
2009 when McChrystal took over control of the war effort. The primary
intelligence collection methods were intercepted phone calls, surveillance by
unmanned drones, and pinpointing the locations of cell phones.48 After 2009, the
targeting broadened from HVTs associated with the Taliban leadership structure
to anyone thought to be contributing to the Taliban war effort.49
Mounting night raids against suspected insurgents represented only the end
result of collection, analysis, and packaging request sent up the chain of
command for approval. Before McChrystal arrived in May 2009, the US was
mounting an estimated 20 raids per month. Within five months, the number
increased to 90 per month. By the spring of 2010, those numbers increased to 250
per month – a 12.5-fold increase in the course of one year. After Petraeus took
over, the number of night raids continued its rapid ascent, reaching 600 per month
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in the summer of 2010. According to some sources, those raids further increased
to over a 40 a night by April 2011.50
After replacing General McChrystal in June 2010, General Petraeus reiterated
the commitment to counterinsurgency operations through his release of
Counterinsurgency Guidance Tactical Directive (Rev 2). The guidance sought
to articulate roles and missions at the operational level more clearly and
reaffirmed the commitment under McChrystal to reduce civilian casualties.
Figures released by ISAF covering the period from July 2008 to September 2010
showed a reduction from 140 per three months at the beginning of the reporting
period to 110 over the final reporting quarter. In February 2011, General Petraeus
and the American Ambassador to Afghanistan published the Integrated U.S.
Government Civilian-Military Campaign Plan in a clear attempt to spell out roles
and missions in the carrying out of the myriad activities underway in-country.
The plan specifically sought to nest tactical operations by military units and
supporting activities by civilian agencies within the operational and strategic
levels of the war.
In the field, the increased troops allowed the United States to deploy
significant forces to execute the same sort of ‘clear, hold, build’ approach to
counterinsurgency that it had used in Iraq. Forces were deployed into the most
dangerous areas of the country in Helmand Province and Kandahar. In February
2010, ISAF launched Operation Moshtarak, in Helmand province using Afghan,
British, and US forces to wrest control over various areas of the province that had
been controlled by the Taliban. The operation was seen as a test of McChrystal’s
new approach of clearing areas to be followed by Afghan security forces and
government officials. The template played to mixed initial success in Marjah –
a focal point of the operation – although violence in Marjah had reduced
significantly by 2012.51
In parallel with the offensive in Helmand, ISAF launched Operation Hamkari
in November 2010 to secure Kandahar – the historic center of the Taliban in
Afghanistan. Like the operation in Helmand, ISAF designed an integrated civil–
military campaign plan to clear the area of the Taliban with a combination of
coalition and Afghan troops and simultaneously launch economic development
projects. Most importantly, the campaign template called for Afghan government
officials to flow into the cleared areas in order to prevent the Taliban from
reasserting their political authority. As was the case in Operation Moshtarak,
military operations aimed at clearing the Taliban were successfully conducted,
but the follow-up stage featuring Afghan government police and administration
was mixed.52
As was the case in Iraq, Petraeus arrived at a critical junction of the war, but
his wider impact remains unclear. He continued the same basic approach that had
been established by McChrystal in orchestrating a national counterinsurgency
campaign. Like in Iraq, he integrated Special Forces into his campaign and
dramatically increased the military pressure and violence directed at the Taliban.
It is unclear, however, whether he and the nationwide counterinsurgency
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campaign had a discernible impact on the overall political and strategic
circumstances of the war. As of this writing, the Taliban has not lost the will to
continue the fight and continues to operate in the field and the government of
Hamid Karzai seems no closer to commanding the political allegiance of the
Afghan people. After over a decade of war, the United States and its coalition
partners are withdrawing, and it is difficult to determine what has actually been
achieved strategically.
Conclusion
As chronicled in this article, Petraeus leaves a complex legacy. This article
argues that Petraeus, without question, played a significant role on American’s
twenty-first century irregular wars in the ways that have been outlined.
By historical standards, his rise to prominence remains unremarkable as a
military leader asked to command forces fighting guerillas thousands of miles
from home. He deserves credit for spearheading the development of new
counterinsurgency doctrine to guide operations, but in the end the manual
represented only one of a host of actions by many organizations that sought to
improve performance in the field. Many of the tactics outlined in the manual
had been tried in the field in Iraq before the manual appeared in print. In terms
of his contributions to the actual conduct of counterinsurgency operations,
perhaps his most significant was the integration of conventional and Special
Forces in program like the Village Stability Operations in Afghanistan and the
refinement of the insurgent kill and capture program using refined targeting in
both wars. These were hardly revolutionary or even innovative changes, but
simply represented variations on the practices of military leaders before him.
Importantly, however, this should not minimize his perhaps most significant
contribution in which he helped create conditions during the surge in Iraq to
cover the US withdrawal in 2011. For that, his country should be eternally
grateful.
In the end, like his predecessors, Petraeus was dispatched to places to clean up
the mess resulting from the poor strategic choices of America’s politicians who
had been given a free hand by a confused and disoriented public following the
9/11 attacks. These politicians substituted slogans for strategy and deployed its
military to fight without clearly articulated objectives that kept shifting over the
course of the wars. In Iraq, what began as a mission to find weapons of mass
destruction evolved into an attempt to build a democracy. In Afghanistan, what
began as a mission to topple the Taliban evolved into a grand social engineering
project. Petraeus seemed magically to appear in the midst of the crisis and offered
up what seemed like a new way to solve the particular military problems facing
the United States in both countries. In the end, however, despite all his attempts
and those around him to craft an alternative narrative, there remains no way gloss
over the strategic failure in Iraq and the inconclusive decade of military
operations in Afghanistan.
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Notes
1. Broadwell, All In. Also see Robinson, Tell Me How this Ends and Gericke, David
Petraeus.
2. For example, in the dust cover endorsement of Broadwell’s book, former NBC News
anchor Tom Brokaw declared that: ‘General Petraeus is one of the most important
Americans of our time, in or out of uniform.’ Following Brokaw’s lead, CNN news
consultant David Gergen declared that Broadwell’s book ‘helps us understand how
Petraeus has become the living legend he is’. The Brookings Institution’s Michael
O’Hanlon similarly declared that in the book: ‘No one gives a truer picture of the
war, or of the finest general of this era and one of the greatest in modern American
history.’ In 2008, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates used taxpayer funds to
compile a video titled Surge of Hope as part of a tribute to his accomplishments,
which played at a reception honoring him before his departure from Iraq in 2008. In
2009, Newsweek Magazine identified Petraeus as one of the 16 most powerful men in
the world.
3. Some of these strands are captured by Thompson, ‘Beneath Glowing Public Image’.
Also see Davis, ‘Truth, lies and Afghanistan’; Porter, ‘How Petraeus Created the
Myth of his Success’; Cohen, ‘General David Petraeus’ fatal flaw’; Walt, ‘The Real
Lessons of l’affaire Petraeus’.
4. Writing with a certain breathless quality, Ricks, The Gamble, 15, states: ‘The answer
for what to do in Iraq would largely come through one person, General David
Petraeus, who, over the next year [2007–2008] would lead the way in revamping the
U.S. approach to the war.’
5. Strachan, The Politics of the British Army.
6. Bacevich, The New American Militarism. The seminal works on civil–military
relations remain Huntington, The Soldier and the State and Janowitz, The
Professional Soldier. Also see Finer, The Man on Horseback.
7. Lineage of the neoconservatives is chronicled in Mann, The Rise of the Vulcans. The
term ‘global war on terror’ is believed to have been initially suggested in the US
context by Bush Administration political adviser Karl Rove, who saw the term as a
powerful metaphor in domestic politics.
8. According to Bob Woodward, Fox News president Roger Ailes tried to convince
Petraeus to run for president unless Obama offered him the job as Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff as reported in Byers, ‘Woodward’.
9. Russell, Innovation, Transformation and War.
10. As particularly noted by Bacevich, The New American Militarism.
11. A good example is Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace and his more recent and equally
poorly conceived and researched book Invisible Armies.
12. During the author’s visit to the NATO Training Mission Afghanistan in January 2011
to evaluate the US adviser program in the Afghanistan Ministry of Defense, many of
the advisers openly stated in interviews that they were not allowed to report negative
assessments on Afghan Army readiness, a command directive that all attributed to
Petraeus.
13. Macgregor, ‘The Petraeus Saga’.
14. For a summary of the major works in counterinsurgency theory, see Thiel et al., ‘Beyond
FM 3-24’. For another literature review, see Kilcullen, ‘Counterinsurgency Redux’.
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15. A narrative masterfully constructed in Porch, Counterinsurgency. Also see Porch,
‘The Dangerous Myths and Dubious Promise of COIN’.
16. An argument perhaps best encapsulated by the orientalist historian Bernard Lewis in
Lewis, What Went Wrong? Lewis’s views found particular favor with Bush
Administration neoconservatives as it prepared to launch the invasion of Iraq.
Harvard historian Niall Ferguson argues this case in Ferguson, Empire.
17. For a good example, see Hanson, ‘Our Enemies, the Saudis’.
18. As chronicled in Moran, National Wars of Liberation.
19. Americans rediscovered the ideas surrounding this time-honored tradition in COIN
in Krepinevich, ‘How to Win in Iraq’.
20. During congressional testimony in October 2005, then Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice was the first senior official to use these terms publicly. Neither
the Central Command’s General John Abizaid nor the US commander in Iraq
General George Casey had any idea what she was talking about. Needless to say, the
phrase eventually became widely adopted as the prevailing concepts used by US
units to guide their employment in the field in Iraq and Afghanistan.
21. Estimates of Iraqi civilian casualties vary between 100,000 and 200,000. An
estimated 1.1 million mostly Sunni Iraqi refugees were displaced during the ethnic
cleansing and sectarian fighting from 2004 to 2007 and remain in refugee camps in
surrounding states. According to the US Army Surgeon General’s Office, through
November 2012, 5225 US servicemen/women were killed in Iraq and Afghanistan
and the number wounded in battle is over 50,000 in both wars; 1572 have had limbs
amputated and 486 of these suffered multiple amputations; 73,674 Army personnel
are judged to be suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder; 30,480 Army
personnel have suffered traumatic brain injury. The data as reported in Wood, ‘U.S.
Wounded in Iraq, Afghanistan’. According to the United Nations, 12,793 Afghan
civilians were killed between 2007 and 2011. Brown University’s Cost of War
Project estimates US expenditures to finance the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
Pakistan could reach $4.4 trillion.
22. Points made in Cohen, ‘The Myth of a Kinder, Gentler War’. For an opposite reading
of history, see Paul and Clarke, ‘Evidentiary Validation of FM 3-24’, 122–8. Also
see more extensive treatment of the success of counterinsurgency in Paul, Clarke,
and Grill, Victory has a Thousand Fathers.
23. Comprehensively addressed in Connable, Embracing the Fog of War.
24. Broadwell, All In; Ricks, The Gamble; and Kaplan, The Insurgents. For a summary
that provides a context for the development of the new manual, see Nagl,
‘Constructing the Legacy of Field Manual 3-24’.
25. This is not to minimize the participation by Navy and Air Force personnel
conducting operations in Afghanistan and Iraq – of which there were thousands over
the course of the war. But both wars were conducted primarily by the land forces,
with the Air Force and Navy in a supporting role.
26. Russell, Innovation, Transformation and War.
27. Chronicled in Ucko, The New Counterinsurgency Era.
28. No US Administration in recent history has ever publicly explained its strategic
priorities in such detail. See National Security Strategy 2006; National Security
Strategy 2002; National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction 2002;
National Strategy for Homeland 2002; National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
2003; National Military Strategy 2004 ; National Defense Strategy 2005; National
Strategy for Maritime Security 2005. This list is by no means exhaustive but provides
a flavor of the unprecedented attention paid by the Bush Administration to such
issues.
29. Stability Operations, Directive 3000.5. Department of Defense.
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30. Irregular Warfare, Department of Defense.
31. Russell, Innovation, Transformation and War.
32. As emphasized by Ucko, The New Counterinsurgency Era.
33. Summarized in Gordon, ‘The Struggle for Iraq’.
34. McCone, Scott, and Mastroianni, The Third ACR in Tal’Afar.
35. Russell, Innovation, Transformation and War.
36. Chronicled in Ricks, The Gamble; Kagan, The Surge.
37. Moss, ‘Bloodied Marines Sound Off’.
38. Woodward, The War Within. Also see Woodward, ‘Secret Killing Program’.
39. The wider context of the surge and the myriad factors affecting insurgent violence
and its relationship to US military operations is trenchantly addressed in Ucko,
‘Counterinsurgency After Afghanistan’. Also see Ollivant, ‘Countering the New
Orthodoxy’ and Porch, ‘Vietnam with a Happy Ending’.
40. As summarized by West, The Strongest Tribe, 187–96.
41. Amos, Eclipse of the Sunnis.
42. As emphasized in Ollivant, ‘Countering the New Orthodoxy’.
43. For an example of the tactical approach of US forces taken during the surge, see
Johnson, Markel, and Shannon, ‘The 2008 Battle of Sadr City’.
44. For a summary of the task force’s capabilities, see Defense Industry Daily, ‘Task
Force Odin’.
45. Details and background on the launch of the Village Stabilization Program in
Chandrasekaran, ‘U.S. Training Afghan Villagers to Fight the Taliban’; Naylor,
‘Program has Afghans as First Line of Defense’; Trofimov, ‘U.S. Enlists
New Afghan Forces’; Connett and Cassidy, ‘Village Stability Operations’.
46. For details on implementing these programs and difficulties of balancing the local
focus with the need to involve district-level government, see Feitt, ‘The Importance
of Vertical Engagement’. For a comparative look VSO in several different cases, see
Dearing, ‘Formalizing the Informal’.
47. Report on Progress and Stability Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,
Department of Defense, 67–8.
48. Use of these techniques in Iraq detailed in Porter, ‘HowMcChrystal and Petraeus Built
an Indiscriminate “Killing Machine”’; Urban, Task Force Black; Shafer, Operation
Dark Heart. Also see Russell, Innovation, Transformation and War, 155–9.
49. Porter, ‘How McChrystal and Petraeus Built an Indiscriminate “Killing Machine”’.
50. The Cost of Kill/Capture, Open Society Foundations.
51. Filkins, ‘Prize on the Battlefields of Marja May Be Momentum’. Also see
Montgomery, ‘One Year After Offensive’; Van Ess, ‘The Fight For Marjah’;
Nissenbaum, ‘Knocked Out Of Power In Afghan Town’; Chandrasekaran,
‘Commanders Fear Time Is Running Out in Marja’.
52. In one indication of the lack of local enthusiasm for the Afghan national government,
locals in Kandahar showed little interest joining the Afghan National Army – despite
chronically high unemployment in the province. See Rivera, ‘Afghan Army Attracts
Few Where Fear Reigns’.
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